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Introduction

by L. Hart Wright
Paul G. Kauper Professor of Law
The University of Michigan
[The following remarks were delivered at the first annual
U-M Law Alumni Reunion and Law Forum on May 30, 1980]

Radical change? Why would powerful competing forces
now be deploying for what could be this decade's most
important federal tax battle?
I say "most important" because the battle will focus on
radical change, that is, change in our system of allocating
the tax burden, for at stake are possibly significant shifts in
the relative burdens borne by capital versus labor and by
the various income classes. I say "most important" also
because the battle may have much to do with the future
quality of life within our shores.
Yet, if our tax system were to be examined solely on a
comp:arative basis and apart from our own economy's
current problems, I suspect the average foreigner would
conclude that radical change was wholly unwarranted. In
no other industrial country does a national tax system
appear to be so noble in its thrust. For our federal system is
based, in general, so preponderently on one's ability to pay.
Social Security contributions aside, practically all federal
revenues are derived from taxes on income, with
progressive rates being applied in both the corporate and
individual sectors. In the latter case-for a family of fouron the first $7,400, the tax is 0 and rises then on the next
bracket only to a relatively modest 14%, with increasingly
higher rates on .succeeding higher brackets, ultimately
reaching a maximum marginal rate of 70%.
In contrast, again laying social security contributions
aside, all major European countries, raise a large part of
their tax revenues from regressive excise taxes. In France,
over one-half is derived from that source; in Germany, it's
over a third.
And on the other side of the tax coin, is there not
something noble also about the further fact that in the last
30 years we have used an increasing part of the revenue
from our so-called progressive taxes to modify the
sometimes harsh income-distribution patterns generated in
the private sector, creating for some segments an
arrangement akin to a negative tax.
No doubt our country's enormous economic growth per
capita over that 30-year period made it a bit easier for
taxpayers to view the tax laws as a proper device by which
we could transfer income from that group to others. Wilbur
Cohen, a former secretary of HEW, would observe that in
the 1950s and '60s, the "haves" had only to "share" that net
increase in growth with the "have-nots" (rather than
sacrifice something they already had) to make possible
within that 30-year period Medicare, Medicaid, AFDC, food
stamps, and financial aid for students, to say nothing of the
dramatic growth in Social Security benefits and
beneficiaries. All of these were possible in part because the
more than doubling of our gross national product facilitated
our more than doubling of federal tax receipts.
And similar to the process involved in compounding
interest, that increased abundance, and the wide sharing
thereof mandated by law, then made it easier for a
relatively idealistic people, not just Ralph Nader, to deflect
their concerns away from societal bread-and-butter issues
and to focus on costly environmental and safety issues, to
enhance the long range quality of future life on this planet.
In consequence, came the enactment of major new lawsimportant here, expensive new laws-affecting use of our
land, our waters, and our air, and bearing more specifically
on such diverse matters as strip mining, location and indeed
establishment of nuclear plants, preservation of wildlife
and underwater species, and abatement of pollution
whether caused by automobile tail pipes, factory sewage, or
smoke stacks, or by mere noise.
All of this no doubt contributed to man's belief in this
nation's relative goodness, and testified also to what at least
appeared to be our ever growing tangible abundance, and
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the two together help explain why, among all embassies
abroad, only at American embassies do you still find people
standing in line "forming there a waiting list"-now
1,000,000 long-of those seeking to migrate to this land.
Current Basic Problem Identified
Two problems:coincide

But, it bears repeating, the attractive but expensive
programmatic statutes of the 1950s and '60s blossomed into
being in part because our governmental leaders and our
people then had thought the increments could be paid for
out of the supposedly ever larger net annual increases in
our GNP, generated by our then ever more efficient and
then ever more productive enterprises, driven as they then
were by cheap energy with their profits being available for
modernization and expansion, providing more jobs, more
goods, more abundance, and more taxes.
But as we moved into the '70s, those native to this land
hardly needed to read an anthology on the world's
imperfections to realize that the foregoing American
economic dream might not be fulfilled because of the
cumulative impact of two considerations.
First, various costs which now have to be shouldered by
our economy were proving to be far greater, relatively, than
the average among us had supposed earlier when those
noble programmatic laws first were adopted or expanded.
Second, realization of this began to dawn on us at a time
when yet other evidence began to suggest that our
economy's own previously growing industrial prowess had
come to a halt.

In no other industrial country does a national
tax system appear to be so noble in its thrust.
The Economy's Rising Burdens

As to the first of these, that is, the previously unexpected
rising costs our economy must now shoulder, any thought
that, for example, our economy could continue to run on
cheap energy had to be abandoned on a January day early
in the '70s.
In contrast to the circumstances 30 years earlier when we
imported almost no oil, by 1972 we were importing more
than 1 billion barrels a year, but at an average cost of only
$2.30 per barrel.
Then OPEC began to raise the price, and by December 31,
of the next year-1973-the cost had gone up 50%, to $3.65
per barrel.
It was on the following day, January 1, 1974, that the roof
began to fall in, for the average price per barrel was
increased 300%, to $10.84.
Then to make matters worse, after six months of
consternation and concern, we decided to go on a
consumption binge. Between 1972 and 1979, our annual
consumption of imported oil increased by over a--billion
barrels.
The consequent enormously escalating burden on our
economy escalated again enormously in 1979 alone. In the
first quarter of that year, the average price we paid for
imported oil was $13.96. By the last quarter, it had almost
doubled, to $23.69, with the average price on December 31
being $25.01.
Then, as we moved into the 1980s back in January, our
largest supplier, but also the most friendly and
traditionally, therefore, the one with the lowest price, Saudi
Arabia, upped its price $2 per barrel. And a second
18

comparable increase was applied earlier in May, its
benchmark price becoming $28 per barrel, 11 times greater
then the average price we paid back in 1972. And the even
higher prices now charged by other OPEC countries are
expected to be increased at OPEC's June meeting. [Editor's
note: They were!]
Thus, our economy must produce at least $85 billion to
pay OPEC for our imported oil over the next 12 months and
the end of the escalating price increases even then will not
be in sight.
Earlier Failure to Pay the Piper
Alongside those increases came also, with cause and
effect entertwined, the most terrifying inflation to which
our economy has been subjected. But among the current
costs which increased were several which were
attributable to benefits or services actually consumed in
earlier years and for which then we simply had failed "to
pay the piper."
Who really contemplated, when we first enacted or
expanded those earlier programmatic laws, that we also
would fail in 19 of the last 20 years fully "to pay the piper,"
running deficits and that, in consequence, now in an era of
high interest rates, over $65 billion in interest must
currently be paid on a national debt now crowding $850
billion.
Include also among current costs for earlier consumed
services, the $25 billion payable annually out of current
revenues to the now retired persons who served earlier as
civil servants and another enormous amount for retired
military personnel, the earlier promised pensions of both
now having swollen further by an escalation clause geared
• to our unprecedented inflation.
But these are mere dwarfs compared to the $128 billion
which must be paid out of current Social Security revenues
over the next 12 months to the more than 35 million Social
Security recipients whose benefits also rose with inflation.
That the system has to pay out to one generation, almost
currently, the very funds which it presently takes in from
two others, is evident from the fact that, as of July 31, 1979,
the system's total assets equalled only four months' worth of
benefit payouts, and constituted, therefore, nothing more
than mere current working capital.
Twenty years ago, when Jack Kennedy became president,
the ratio of active workers to Social Security recipients was
5 to 1 and the tax rate on those workers was a modest 3%
which applied to maximum covered wages of $4,800. Then
the maximum annual contribution per employee reached
$144, a contribution matched by his employer, and total
annual disbursments equalled only $10 billion.
As of January 1, 1981, the rate, compared with Kennedy's
time, will have more than doubled (to 6.65%). and the
maximum base against which it is applied will have jumped
by six times (to $29,700)-the two-component January jump
itself, in the case of a person earning $30,000, being 24% .
In part these increases were necessary because now
there are only three workers per recipient, not five as in
Kennedy's time. Further, benefits currently to be paid out
were swollen also by an escalation clause responsive to
inflation. Indeed, the latter helps explain why an individual
retiring in 1979 at age 65, if then still married to a dependent
spouse, would have expected at that time to receive over his
retired years 11 times the amount he personally paid into
the fund.
Who would have expected 20 years ago that the mere
increment in this coming fiscal year's payout, attributable
solely to inflation, would far exceed the total cost of the
entire program during the year Kennedy became president.
And the worst, we now know, is yet to come. Forty-five

years from now, when those born during the decade-long
baby boom following World War II are on Social Security,
there apparently will be only two workers to support each
Social Security recipient and even this ratio assumes some
improvement in our currently depressed fertility rate.
The Economy's Stagnation
The public's more or less sudden awareness in the '70s of
these unexpectedly high costs came, as I have said, almost
simultaneously with highly publicized manifestations that
our economy, relative to that of others, was in trouble.
Tolerable it may have been that the Japanese, by the
early part of the '70s, through exports to us, came close to
taking over our television industry. But, as to our future life,
think twice about the more wide-ranging adverse
implications of a comment made to Congress in the middle
of that decade by President Ford's secretary of the treasury,
to the effect, with respect to a much more basic industry,
that a relatively new steel plant in Kimitsu, Japan, was more
than twice as productive per worker as the enormous but
old United States Steel Company plant in Gary, Indiana.
By the end of the '70s (before the current recession),
David M. Roderick, "Big Steel's" chief executive, was
acknowledging openly to the press that his company could
not come even close to generating enough capital to replace
its aging plants with modern mills like those of its
"agressive global rivals" in Japan and Western Germany,
and that "assuming no changes in steel's cost-price
relationship, there is no question that the domestic industry
is going to continue to shrink." Indeed, U.S. Steel itself then
again put off going forward with construction in Ohio of its
first new integrated steel mill in 26 years.
Today, moving into a new decade, we hear as to an
illustrative third industry, one which we thought was as
American as apple pie-automobiles-that a greater
number of cars actually will be produced during 1980 in
Japan than we will produce in the United States. Indeed,
they now have taken over, through exports to America,
almost a quarter of our own domestic market, their total
exports throughout the world presently having reached well
over four million annually.

The '70s Basic Productivity Problem

But these illustrations, while very disturbing, actually are
manifestations of diverse problems intertwined. The prime
concern on which the tax controversy will focus is singular
and basic. In the 1950s and '60s, our economy literally
leaped ahead through productivity gains-real output gains
per man-hour of work. The national income per person
employed rose by over 70% in that period, and the
consequent benefits were shared widely through new laws.
But last year, President Carter's secretary of the treasury
reminded us that in the '70s our annual productivity gains
began to drop significantly, first down to 2%, then down to
1 %, and last year-before this recession-zilch.

Effect of Reduction in Productivity Growth

On this count-long-term productivity growth ratesJapan and all our major European competitors except
Britain have been outstripping us substantially.
Without real growth in productivity, our total standard of
living is certain to go down, and the fact that those foreign
countries, with which we do compete on the international
marketplace, are enjoying significant growth in
productivity could be a contributing factor.

But, looking only at the domestic front, without real
growth in our productivity per man hour, as our ratio of
active workers to Social Security recipients drops from 3 to
1 down to 2 to 1; either the active working generation or the
retired generation will have to take a real and significant
cut in the quality of life they had expected, thus creating
added tension between the generations. Indeed, this
process could begin with the next scheduled substantial
increase in the Social Security tax this coming January with
the active work force being the certain loser.
And apart from that, without an increase in productivity,
no increase in wages is possible without inflation. And any
such inflation would simply mean that any causal-related
increase in wages in fact would not improve the quality of
this nation's material life.
Finally, without growth, no new governmental programs,
however needed, could be initiated without sacrificing
some program to which some of our people had grown
accustomed. The threat of such retrenchments is certain to
increase tension and the political in-fighting associated
with our governmental processes.
Need for Increased Capital Investments
Greater productivity in terms of output per man hour of
work, is itself dependent on many factors, including even
education that affects, for example, the quality of our
scientists and engineers who make use of research and
development expenditures, and of our managers whose
business decisions ultimately can affect the productivity

[Our] economy must produce at least $85
billion to pay OPEC for our imported oil over
the next 12 months.
per hour of our workers.
But in the end, since we cannot stretch the length of one
hour, and are not likely to increase the number of regular
hours each employee is to work in a given day or to carry
around a whip, technological breakthroughs and better and
more industrial equipment become musts, suggesting there
must be more capital investment therein.
Additional capital investment is needed not only to
provide better plant and equipment so that each existing
employee becomes more productive, but also to provide for
expansion, i.e., for additional plant and equipment which in
turn will provide the needed additional jobs to
accommodate our expanding labor force.
In this latter connection, observe that since 1973, annual
non-residential fixed investments in plant and equipment,
as a proportion of our annual gross national product, have
not increased. Indeed even the rate of increase based on
constant non-inflated dollars has been only half as fast as
the rate of increase in the size of our civilian work force,
i.e., in the group who have or want jo_hs. Thus, our capital
investments, completely contrary to our earlier experience
in the '60s, have been lagging behind the rate of increase
among those seeking jobs.
Thus, the question: From where is the necessary capital
to come?
Sources of Capital Formation
First Source: Personal Savings
A significant part always has come from the personal
after-tax savings of individuals who either invest directly or
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deposit their savings in banks which then lend them to
investors.
And given the inflation and its threat to our individual
sense of security, one might have expected, beginning say in
1975, that we as individuals would have started to save an
increased percentage of our after-tax incomes.
In fact, however, we seem to have gone on a consumptionspending spree, perhaps "to buy consumers goods before
prices rose even higher." Whatever the reason, over this
recent five-year period, from 1975 to the present, the share
of our personal after-tax incomes actually saved dropped
annually from 7.7% to 5.8%, then to 5.0%, 4.9%, and in 1979
to 4.5%, with the figure being only 3.3% in 1979's last
quarter.
In recent years, comparable personal savings rates in
each of the other major industrial countries, including even
Britain, was far in excess of our percentage rate, with
Japan, Germany, and France leading the list.
Further, here, to make matters worse, household
borrowings exploded. Outstanding consumers' installment
credit alone, home purchases aside, had increased by an
additional $40 billion in 1979 alone. Moreover, adding in
borrowings to purchase homes, whereas the ratio of
personal savings to household borrowings in the peak year
1975 stood at 2to1; in 1978, it was just the reverse.
Finally, observe that, in any event, personal savings
(which do include savings invested in a home) are less
available to the business sector for investment in
machinery-to the extent those savings are invested in
homes.
Second Source: Corporate Sector's Internal Sources

A second source of new capital involves the corporate
sector's own internally generated funds.
To finance acquisition of new equipment and buildings,
this sector has available two internal sources.
The first and largest comes from that part of this sector's
business receipts representing capital allowances,
principally depreciation deductions. In 1979, these capital
allowances amounted to $187 billion, a sum much larger
than 1979's $73.8 billion of personal savings.
However, investment funds generated by capital
allowances are intended, over the long haul, merely to
accommodate replacement and modernization, not
increments. Unfortunately, in recent years, because
depreciation deductions are geared to our plants' and
equipments' original cost, even the contemplated aim of
mere replacement cannot be achieved if only because of
inflation and the consequent enhanced cost of new
substitute machinery and industrial buildings.
Turn now to the corporate sector's second largest
internally generated source of investment funds-its
retained after-tax profits not distributed as dividends.
This differs from the first source (capital allowances) in
that, in theory at least, the former (retained after-tax
profits) should have enabled this sector to make net n e w
investments in plant and equipment.
But over much of this decade that actually has not been
possible. While we treat a corporation's entire nominal
profit as "income" in the sense of taxing the whole; now for
a number of years, a portion of the after-tax profit retained
after paying dividends actually represented what some
described as "phantom profit" in the sense that it actually
was not available for incremental investments. This was
because a portion-in 1979, $16.7 billion-was consumed by
the previouslymentioned inflation-generated short-fall in
capital allowances to accommoda te mere replacements.
Even more unfortunately, an even larger portion of the
cash flow generated by 1979's $91.9 billion of after-tax
20

retained profits. Namely, $41.8 billion, was needed to meet
the inflation-generated increased cost necessary merely to
replace inventory previously sold.
Thus, in the end, of 1979s' $91.9 billion in retained aftertax profits, only $34.4 billion actually was available for net
new capital investments.
Type of External Funds Sought by Corporations

Adding to these worries is another: the possibility that
corporations, in seeking funds from outside sources, may be
creating yet another related problem.
For years new stock issues have accounted only for a very
minor part-on average, only about 3 to 4%-of the capital
investments made by non-financial corporations.
To a much greater extent, on looking to the outside,
corporations have obtained new funds by going further into
debt. Perhaps this was in part because individuals in
deploying their personal savings had departed from the
equities market. a phenomenon most pronounced among
younger investors who simply headed for the nearest bank
or were willing only to purchase secure bonds, the interest
rates on which, as a new phenomenon, had started to
outstrip the so-called "total return" from stocks.
Whatever the reason might be, some fear that the
resulting substantial increase in the corporate sector's debtequity ratio-which has more than doubled over the last 25
years-leaves it uncomfortably vulnerable when we
encounter the downward side of a business cycle.
And this worrisome change brings me to a question: Is
this particular corporate practice due at all to the impact of
our federal tax law on the corporate sector, and does that
impact otherwide unfortunately and unfairly impede
• capital formation?
Relative Biases of U.S. Tax System
In General

In respect to that general question, our tax system does
include three relevant biases and all three will be points of
concern in the coming tax battle.
I. The corporate income tax itself does contain a bias
against equity funding, favoring debt financing;
II. Our income tax system, now viewed as a whole, also
does contain two significant biases against ordinary
income derived from capital, when compared to that
derived from services; and
III. Our entire federal tax system relies much more heavily
on income taxes than do most of the other industrial nations
and, when viewed comparatively among nations, relatively
does reflect a bias against capital formation.
U.S. Corporate Tax System's Bi~s
As to our corporate income tax's bias against equity
funding, note that such part of an incorporated factory's
operating profits that is used to pay interest on borrowed
capital is deducted from its gross profit in arriving at the
corporation's own net tax base. In effect, a zero tax rate is
applied at the corporate level to that portion of the factory's
operating profit used to pay that interest. Thus, such profit
is taxed only once, to the recipient-creditor at tha t marginal
rate appropria te to his income.
In contrast, to the extent that corporation obtained its
capital from shareholders, profits attributable to that
capital do suffer a tax at the corporate level, most of it at a
stated rate of 46 %.

Additionally, that portion of the corporate sector's profit
remaining after allowance for its own income tax will, if
distributed to individual shareholders, be piled on top of
their other incomes and be taxed at their highest marginal
rates. Immunity from this second tax traditionally was
confined by statute to the first $100 of dividends received
each year by an individual. Thus, if a husband and wife
owned their shares jointly, together they could exclude only
the first $200 of dividends. These quite modest immunities
were doubled by a bill enacted in April 1980 and were
extended to interest received from bank deposits and
corporate bonds.
Nevertheless, the great bulk of the $52 billion in
dividends declared in 1979, to the extent received by
individuals and not by tax exempt organizations, did suffer
a second and substantial tax on being received by the
individual recipients.
Thus, while there is but one tax on distributed interest,
there are two significant taxes on most distributed
corporate profits, and this must be taken as a given fact
however one otherwise feels about a complementary and
arguable question: Who actually bears the economic
burden of those two taxes?
Income: Tax System's Biases Against Income from Capital
This so-called double tax on that portion of corporate
profits distributed as dividends tends, standing alone, to
make our whole federal income tax system biased against
income from capital, for no such double tax is applied to the
income from wages.
Further exacerbating that bias is the fact that, at the
individual level. marginal tax rates on ordinary income
from capital reach 70%, where-as a normal marginal ceiling
of 50% has been placed on marginal rates applicable to
wages.
Foreign Systems Mitigate Their Double Tax
Among major industrial countries, the United States
stands almost alone in continuing to impose two full taxes
on that share of corporate profits distributed as dividends to
individual shareholders. Almost all of the other industrial
nations have adopted one of two basic devices which have
the effect of reducing the bias favoring debt financing, by
whittling down on the so-called double tax we apply to
profit distributed as a dividend.
The first method is illustrated by the so-called dual-rate
approach of Germany. There the regular corporate rate of
56% is applied solely to undistributed profits; the
corporation itself.need pay only 36% on any profit it
distributes.
Belgium, France, England, and Canada illustrate the
second method. There, a corporation's own tax is
unaffected by whether its after-tax profit is to be retained
or distributed. The French rate, for example, is 50% in
either case. The difference comes at the shareholder level.
Stockholders there, after applying their own marginal rates
to dividends received, reduce the resulting tentative tax by
a credit allowed them for a significant portion of the tax
which the corporation itself actually had suffered. In
France, the formula is designed so that a shareholder whose
"grossed-up" dividend tentatively would suffer a top
marginal rate of 50% would, because of the credit, only pay
a net tax equal to 25% of his actual dividend. In America, he
would pay 50%.
Eisenhower's administration concluded that we should,
over a transition period, move toward the second of these
systems and, with this in mind, it secured enactment of an
initially modest arrangement permitting shareholders, on
receiving a dividend, to take a credit, in effect, for what

intially was to be a small part of the tax the corporation had
paid. But several years later with President Kennedy's
backing, Congress terminated the earlier tentative move
toward one of the European systems.
Observe that both devices used abroad have the effect,
initially, of increasing the net after-tax yield of stocks,
making them more attractive to investors. Germany, though
formerly utilizing only one of those two devices, recently
adopted both. Now the shareholder, on receiving a
dividend, gets a credit for the reduced tax which the
corporation itself paid on profits distributed. In net effect,
in Germany there now is only one tax on distributed
corporate profits, and that is the tax fixed by the
shareholder's own marginal rate.
Foreign Nations' Greater Reliance on Excise Taxes
Finally, when a tax system is viewed as a whole, there is
another reason why all tax systems in Europe have a
relatively stronger element of bias favoring capital
formation than does our own federal system.
This follows from the fact that, relatively speaking, we
rely on income:taxes for a far greater proportion of our
revenue than do they. And as you know, as a general
proposition, income is included in the recipient's tax base
whether the after-tax amount is spent or invested.
But it is otherwise with respect generally to sales taxes on
consumers goods. In the latter instance, that portion of one's
income which is deposited in interest-earning bank
accounts, or used to purchase corporate stocks, is free of
that tax.
Thus, this type of tax, in contrast to income taxes,
includes some incentive to save and this is so whether or not
it proves to be adequate in the face of any given set of
counter-incentives.
European legislators, spurred on by the EEC, make
substantial use of that incentive effect. Whereas our own
federal government derives relatively little revenue from
such excise taxes, Social Security contributions aside,
France-as previouslymentioned-derives just over half of
its other revenue from such excise taxes, and Germany over
one-third. There, as in all other Western industrial
countries, governments rely heavily on what is called a
value added tax, a sophisticated form of the more familiar
sales tax.
Conclusion: Power Blocs Respond
Kennedy's Non-Tax Proposal
Among our own leading political activitists whose
ambitions or responsibilities have forced them to outline
publicly their own proposed solutions to our disturbing and
steadily deteriorating long-range circumstance, some-in
their responses-have been more affected than others by
the additional but hopefully temporary complications
generated by a hopefully temporary recession.
At one extreme, both on this count and also in calling for
yet "more government," i.e., more direct governmental
intervention in connection with both our long- and shortterm problems, was Senator Edward Kennedy. In a major
policy pronouncement back in May, he called for a massive
"Marshall Plan" to re-industrialize our country, envisioning
a program at least as large as that which we initiated in
Europe after World War II.
He spoke of a new "economic partnership" embracing
government, business, labor, and academia. And within the
first 100 days following what he hoped back in May would
be his own coming inauguration, he promised to create a
quasi-public corporation empowered to provide grants,
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loans, guarantees, and subsidies to individuals, businesses,
research organizations, and cities interested in new
economic development or revitalization of existing
businesses or industries. The corporation's funds would
come from Congress and from borrowing in the capital
markets.
Additionally, before as well as during the Democratic
Convention, he urged adoption of a $12 billion subsidy for
job and training programs, while simultaneously urging
across-the-board controls on prices, wages, profits,
dividends, and rents to get at inflation, and gasoline
rationing as a further attack on our energy problem.

Responses of Most U.S. Power Blocs: In General
Most, though not all, other outspoken public figures have
called primarily, however, for tax changes, arguing first
that increased capital investments are essential if we are to
increase our productivity, implement technological
breakthroughs, and simultaneously meet the needs of an
expanding labor force. Second, they assert that the
requisite increase in capital investments is not likely to be
achieved without making fairly radical changes in our tax
laws.
But even among these observers, substantial
disagreement has existed as to method, that is, as to the type
of tax law change which should be adopted from among the

Forty-five years from now, when those born
during the decade-long baby boom following
World War II are on Social Security, there
apparently will be only two workers to
support each Social Security recipient and
even this ratio assumes some improvement in
our currently depressed fertility rate.
possible competing alternatives.
One issue separating the observers might be described in
terms of how general or how rifle-like the requisite tax
response should be.
On one side are public figures whose proposed remedy
was shaped in part by an even more broadly based concern
regarding America. To them, in complete contrast to
Senator Kennedy, the capital-investment problem is only
one of many unfortunate consequences springing from
expensive and, to them, distasteful "Big Government."
Reagan's Views re Individual Tax Cuts
The antidote, as Governor Reagan puts it, is "to get the
government off our backs" and, to that end, he supports to
the hilt the broad shotgun approach of the original KempRoth bill. The latter focused only on individuals and
proposes to reduce by 30% over a three-year period all
income tax marginal rates applicable to each of the brackets
applied to individuals. At the end of that transition period,
illustratively, the top marginal rate would be 50%. in place
of the present 70%, and the bottom 10%, in place of the
current 14%.
This would have involved a massive tax cut which,
viewed in isolation, would reduce by $90 billion the
revenue which otherwise annually would reach the
treasury beginning three years hence.
Some, though clearly not all, conservative supporters of
22

that proposed cut appear to be more dedicated "Keynsians"
than are those who characterize themselves as such. For
some such supporters suggested that individuals, in
aggregate, by virtue of such a reduction, then would use the
tax saving in a fashion which would revitalize our economy,
as did occur, they assert, from a tax cut in John Kennedy's
day. Some even went on also to imply that the revitalized
economy then would generate sufficient additional revenue
to offset the aforementioned revenue loss.
As to the first of those two matters, those who, by so
stimulating our economy on the consumer's side, think they
thereby would solve our long-range capital investment and
productivity problems are, to say the least, engaging in a
questionable comparison to the Kennedy era.
They ignore several other very substantial but rifle-like
incentives which the Kennedy administration fostered for
the supply-side of our economy, to facilitate increased
capital investments-illustratively, the investment credit,
more favorable depreciation-allowance practices, and a
four percentage-point reduction in the rate structure.
Also overlooked by those who look only to Kemp-Roth,
and who rely by way of analogy on the Kennedy
administration's experience, is a major difference between
our economy now and our economy then.
Not the least of these differences is the existence now of
terrifying inflation, which an individual tax-reduction
stimulant of such massive proportions would tend, absent a
counter-weight, to exacerbate given, particularly, the even
now projected deficit of $30 billions for fiscal '81.
Some Kemp-Roth supporters, though fully aware of the
foregoing, stand fast, nevertheless, in their support of the
proposal if only because they actually do not contemplate
that this massive tax reduction would be allowed for long to
create additional artificial purchasing power on the
.. consumption side of our economy.
Nor do they contemplate that the resulting drop in
revenue would generate, for long, government deficits
which, if they did ensue, would force the government to
increase its borrowing from banks and investors, thus
soaking up the private savings generated by the tax
reduction itself.
Indeed, these particular supporters of the original KempRoth bill actually favor tax reduction precisely because, in
"getting government off our backs," they also plan to reduce
growth in government expenditures, by applying some kind
of ceiling on the budget.
Mr. Reagan himself, for example, recently acknowledged
this would be necessary and promised that, by a
"comprehensive assault on waste and inefficiency," he
would reduce the otherwise projected inflation-generated
growth in the expenditure budget by 2% in '81. In later
years, the cut would gradually increase to 7% annually
compared with what otherwise would have been spent on
the basis of current projections. But even with these
expenditure cuts, and after taking account of projected
increases in revenue generated by his projected tax cuts, he
acknowledges a projected estimated $27 billion deficit in '81
and $21 billion deficit in '82.
Inflation Indexing
Some who otherwise do not support Kemp-Roth do
believe, nevertheless, that we should neutralize the effect
of the "inflation-creep" which, for example, forces the
income of individuals to be taxed in increasingly higher
rate brackets though their real incomes have not gone up.
It has been estimated that, with the current inflation rate,
the treasury derives an annual revenue windfall or bonus
of at least $16 billion (and perhaps as high as $22 billion)thereby diverting for the public sector's use, and away from

the private sector, a growing percentage of our GNP.
Some persons, though critical of Kemp-Roth, would
neutralize the effect of this "bracket-creeping" by indexing
certain provisions of the tax law to the inflation rate.
On the other hand, Kemp-Roth supporters (including Mr.
Reagan) note that the treasury's windfall, generated by
bracket creeping, will be far more than offset in the case of
individuals by that bill's cumulating three-year 30% tax cut
in rates.
However, regarding method, these two power blocs will
come closer together as of the moment that three-year
period ends. For the Kemp-Roth bill, in addressing itself to
the end of its three-year tax-cutting period, mandates what
only then would become an annual adjustment raising the
dollar amounts of the various rate brackets and of the $1,000
per-capita exemption by a percentage increase geared to
each year's increase in the consumer price index.
Critics of this narrowly focused index arrangement, while
acknowledging that there is merit in the underlying idea,
suggest that it renders all too simple what actually is a very
complex idea. In truth, the proposal does ignore a
tremendous host of obviously related sub-issues, such as
whether the cost of all investments also should be linked to
the consumer price index, and whether indexing, if applied
to income, should, in justice, be extended to the debt side of
the ledger-in which case gain could arise (though a debt is
paid off in full) if, because of inflation, that repayment
actually is made with cheaper dollars than those originally
borrowed. Otherwise, the tax law would be giving a tax
preference to the debtor class.

the form of an indexing arrangement to get at bracket
creeping.
Third, to deal more directly with the energy problem, he
fosters a 50¢ per-gallon gasoline tax, with the proceeds
going into the Social Security Fund, to facilitate a reduction
in Social Security taxes which under existing law go up
substantially this coming January, and also to help pay the
increased amounts to which beneficiaries will be entitled
under the law's automatic escalator geared to inflation.
Fourth, otherwise, until the budget is in balance, his aides
assert that tax law changes should be confined to the supply
side of our economy and to its long-range problems. And
even as to this, as they see it, some further delay may be in
order.
Carter's Opposition to Kemp-Roth
Four weeks ago, on August 27, the third candidate,
President Carter, outlined his proposals. Earlier, relying on
a combination of inflationary concerns and cost-benefit
arguments, he had rejected Kemp-Roth's 30% tax cut for
individuals.
Administration spokesmen at that time had asserted that
this massive deficit-generating cut was a most inefficient
way to accomplish our most important objective-to get at
the capital investment-productivity problem.
In short, Carter's advisers note the absence of any built-in
link between the dollar amount of such generalized tax
reductions and capital investments. They express the fear
that an unknown but substantial part of the tax savings

Senate Finance Committee re Personal Tax Cuts
One month ago, on August 20, the Senate Finance
Committee, in unanimously reporting out its own
comprehensive tax proposal, in effect rejected indexing to
counteract inflation. Also rejected w.as the Reagan
supported Kemp-Roth commitment to a three-year 30% cut
in individual rates. Indeed, concern regarding cost in lost
revenue vis-a-vis a desire to provide significant tax
reduction to the supply or business side of our economy led
that committee even to forego offering individuals as much
as a 10% cut for the single year 1981. But-as to
individuals-the committee did go part of the way, by
approving for that single year a much less costly reduction,
namely, a drop in all marginal rates by variable amounts
ranging from one to three percentage points. The top rate
would drop from 70% down to 67%, with the bottom 14%
rate dropping to 12%- thus slashing treasury receipts for
calendar year '81 by $13 billion.
This cut in marginal rates would be supplemented by a
$100 increase in the per capita exemption-at a revenue
cost of $5 billion-and by modest increases in the zero
bracket amounts.
Another almost $3 billion would be lost by increasing the
capital gains deduction from 60% to 70%, and by reducing
the corporate rate on such gains from 30% to 28%.

Anderson: re Personal Tax Cuts
Ten days later, on August 31, Representative John
Anderson indicated not only his opposition to the Reagan
supported Kemp-Roth but also his unwillingness even to
compromise. He asserts, first , that there should be no
across-the-board income tax cuts for individuals until we
have attained a balanced budget. Sacrifice, he says, is
appropriate to that noble and necessary end.
Second, he does agree, once that budget is in balance, that
the first individual cut which can be afforded should take

[In] the end, of 1979's $91.9 billion in retained
after-tax profits, only $34.4 billion actually
was available for net new capital investments.

achieved by that bill, particularly among the millions of low
and lower-medium bracket taxpayers, would simply be
spent on more consumer goods, not saved for capital
investments.
Carter's Proposed Cut for Individuals
But while the administration says it is opposed to a
general tax cut for individuals, it also knows, first, that a
recession is hardly the time to increase taxes and, second,
that this coming January, by virtue of a pre-recession 1977
law, our Social Security taxes on employees and employers
are going up, both the rates and the base, and to the tune of
another $15 billion.
To offset the rate increase component, the administration
now has proposed to allow employers and employees to
take a credit against their income taxes, the amount to be
equal to 8% of the Social Security taxes-they actually pay.
This will reduce income tax revenues by about $12 billion.
Whether for political reasons, notions of equity, or
because of the President's "born-again-Christian"
perspectives, his tax package also takes on a problem
ignored by the other two candidates, in that he follows the
lead of a Senate Finance Committee proposal in dealing
with the so-called "marriage penalty" now suffered by our
millions of two-earner families. Half of all women still
living with their husbands hold jobs, and 60% of those
couples now pay a tax higher than they would pay if they
had foregone marriage and had chosen simply to live
together in "sin", filing separate returns.
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Because different rate schedules and different zero
bracket amounts are used by married and single persons,
two-earner married couples must pay more tax than two
singles living together in any case, generally speaking,
where the lower-earning spouse earns at least 20% of the
couple's income. Indeed the marriage penalty is greatest
when they earn exactly equal amounts, 50-50. That penalty
disappears completely, however, and, indeed, slowly
emerges into a marriage "bonus" as the lower-spouse's
earnings begin to fall below 20% of the couple's income.
The President, adhering to a proposal unanimously
approved only a bit earlier by the Senate Finance
Committee, would reduce, but not completely eliminate,
the differential between two-earner married couples and
two singles who live together. He would allow the married
couple to take a deduction equal to 10% of the lowerearning-spouse's earned income, though this deduction
could never exceed $3,000.
Because of that ceiling on the deduction, a substantial
penalty will remain where the earned income of the lowerearning-spouse passes beyond the $30,000 mark. But most of
the so-called penalty would be eliminated for most twoearner married couples, at a cost next year of $4.7 billion in
lost revenue.
In the end, however, this arrangement is likely to
antagonize the other more traditional one-half of all
married couples involving wives who do not hold jobs. Will
they not feel short-changed once they learn that their
deduction will be zero, and that they, if one spouse earns
$60,000, will pay tax at their highest marginal rate on $3,000
which has been freed from tax in the case of two-earner
families where each spouse earns $30,000.
The unfortunate fact: It is impossible to design a formula
which is equitable to all three interested groups.

Synopsis re Cuts for Individuals
A comparative profile synopsizing the total reduction
effects of the foregoing alternative plans on individuals
show Mr. Reagan fostering by far the largest cut, with those
in higher brackets enjoying far greater relief, both in dollar
amounts and proportionately, than would be the case under
the other plans.
This follows from the fact, first, that an across-the-board
cut, such as 10% in marginal rates provides the greatest
percentage point reduction to those in the higher brackets,
and second, it so happens that the higher brackets cover
wider ranges of income, so that each percentage point
reduction in marginal rates affects a larger dollar amount of
income.
For example, with reference just to rates, the first-year
10% cut under the Reagan-supported plan would reduce the
highest very large bracket by seven percentage points,
dropping it from 70% to 63%, whereas the reduction of a
taxpayer in the 40% bracket would be only four percentage
points.
The Senate Finance Committee's proposed reduction is
both less drastic and tilts less toward the upper brackets.
While the largest percentage point reduction is the three
percentage-point drop from 70% to 67%, an additional total
dollar reduction-amounting to over one-third of those
generated by rate reduction-comes from increases in the
exemption deduction and in the zero-bracket amounts.
Mr. Carter's plan is even less drastic and tilts more
toward those in middle and lower brackets. This follows
from the fact that Carter, basically, opposed a general tax
decrease but was willing, through an income-tax credit, to
neutralize what otherwise would have been a Social
Security tax increase that could affect only the first $29,700
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of income. Further, his attack on the marriage penalty also
has a cap or ceiling, so that the maximum cut available is
available where the lower earning spouse's earned income
reaches $30,000.
Of course, Mr. Anderson's proposal regarding individuals
is the least drastic, and tilts not at all, since zero reduction is
accorded one and all.

Emel'ging Agreement on the Supply Side: 10-5-3
Though there are significant differences among the three
candidates regarding cuts on the individual consumer side
of our economy, the otherwise developing substantial
popularity of a proposal made by yet others, directed more
specifically to the supply side and to the capital investment
problem, has-as to that side-brought the three candidates
within visual range of each other.
The story begins with the proposed Jones-Connable
Capital Cost Recovery Act, HR 4546, now more popularly
characterized as the 10-5-3 Bill, the principal original
sponsors of which are two influential members of the
House Ways and Means Committee, one being the ranking
minority member.
This proposal, in a nutshell and in its original undiluted
form, was directed exclusively at the business sector; that
is, at the supply side rather than the consumption side of
our economy. Its preamble is more discreet, however,
characterizing the bill's purpose in terms of increasing
"capital investment and expanded employment
opportunities."
But it would seek to accomplish this by increasing
enormously the cash flow available to business,
accomplishing this by substantially accelerating business'
• d~preciation deductions, telescoping them into a period
very much shorter than the actual useful life of the affected
property and thereby reducing substantially the time span
over which, for tax purposes, business now must spread its
depreciation deductions.
Residential type buildings would be unaffected.
Otherwise the formula is simple enough. The cost of
commercial and industrial buildings could be written off
over 10 years, equipment over 5 years, and autos and light
trucks over 3 years, with the limitation that, as to this third
category, acquisitions to the extent exceeding $100,000 in
any one year would not qualify.

Carter's Objections to 10-5-3
The administration opposes this bill while
simultaneously conceding that our present depreciation
arrangements warrant change.
The administration charges, first, that the tax break and,
thus, the investment stimulant would vary widely among
different industries. This would occur because, in practial
terms, the bill offers proportionately a much larger tax
break to long-life property, such as a steel mill furnace,
than to a shorter-life machine which, if it had an actual
useful life of only five years, would get no additional break
at all. Further, so the administration asserts, there is no
evidence that productivity is increased more by a bit earlier
replacement of long-life property than by a bit earlier
replacement of shorter-life property. Thus, contend the
bill's opponents, that proposal's lack of neutrality between
industries will artificially and, according to the
administration, also irrationally distort the relative thrust
and potential growth of the diverse segments that make up
our economy.
The second objection goes back to the cumulative impact

of two considerations. The bill would apply only to property
acquired after the bill's effective date. And this is one of
two reasons why the bill's impact in the first year would be
fairly modest. The second: even as to newly acquired
property, the reduction in the longer useful lives which now
are used for tax purposes-down to the newly proposed
shorter periods-would be staged in over a five-year
transition period.
In consequence of these two limiting factors, the first
year's revenue loss, and thus the stimulant, would be a
modest $4 to $5 billion.
However, the phasing-in transition approach is criticized
by the administration becaue the phase-in would create a
perverse and counter-productive effect, part cularly with
respect to buildings or long-life machinery. By postponing
an acquisition a year or two-to the detriment of the
economy-a taxpayer could obtain a much shorter useful
life for depreciation purposes.
Third, an administration spokesman also originally
contended that, in one major respect, the 10-5-3 proposal
was quite inefficient. Non-residential commercial
buildings, as distinguished from industrial buildings,
though also eligible for this tax break, were said to
contribute little if any to increased productivity. On this
count at least, the British were more efficient, concentrating
on machinery. Indeed, even an earlier labor government,
not just Margaret Thatcher's, allowed a full deduction for
the cost of machinery in the year of its acquisition.

[W]hile there is but one tax on distributed
interest, there are two significant taxes on
most distributed corporate profits, and this
must be taken as a given fact however one
otherwise feels about a complementary and
arguable question: Who actually bears the
economic burden of those two taxes?
Compared with our existing practice, the British provide
an enormous tax break. But our own treasury's statisticians
say that the " present value of the [ultimate) tax saving from
the combination of the investment credit and [this bills']
accelerated deductions is greater than full, first year writeoff would be."
Indeed, the enromous size of the ultimate fiscal impact of
this proposal has to be the fourth but also the
administration's most important concern. While the firstyear cost in lost revenue was a modest $4 billion, according
to the treasury's statisticians the annual revenue loss
directly attributable to the resulting increase ~n deductions
would reach $50 billion in 1984 and $85 billion in 1988.
The treasury does acknowledge that, by 1984, when the
directly attributable revenue loss reaches only $50 billion,
the consequently induced but necessarily lagging economic
expansion QY then also should have provided new revenue
"feedbacks" on the order of $15 billion annually, the net
revenue loss in that year being then only $35 billion.
' Even so, the administration had to recognize the further
probability that, in the end, this amount would represent
only a part of the revenue loss. Why?
The.answer is simple enough. In terms of political
feasibility, this bill probably could not pass unless coupled
also with a t least some tax cut for individuals. Since the
revenue "feedback" is bound to lag, the magnitude of the
two cuts together obviously invites inflationary risks and
jeopardizes governmental programs the administration
favors.

Connable's Wholesale Alternative: Reagan's New Position
One of the two principal sponsors of the 10-5-3 bill-the
politically astute ranking minority member of the House
Ways and Means Committee-recognized a year ago that it
might not be possible for business alone to have the whole
cake.
Thus, as a possible alternative to his bill, he introduced
HR 5050. It coupled his 10-5-3 depreciation arrangement
with a variety of provisions cutting taxes on individuals,
including a one-time approximately 10% reduction in
marginal rates.

Senate Finance Committee re Supply Side's Depreciation
Something approaching whittled down versions of those
two features-at much reduced costs in lost revenuefound their way into the previously mentioned Senate
Finance Committee proposal that emerged last month.
On the business side, but only as to tangible personal
property, not buildings, it proposed a "2-4-7-10"
depreciation system designed around four open ended cost
recovery accounts, in contrast to 10-5-3's more or less single
or flat five year rule for such equipment.
Tangible personal property, according to the committee's
bill, would be assigned to the particular recovery account
which was at least 40% shorter than the current mid-point
useful life under the present ADR system. For example,
assets used to manufacture clothing have a current midpoint life of nine years which this bill would shorten to four
years, i.e., the useful life would be telescoped by more than
half, since assignment to the seven year class would not
quite satisfy the "at least" feature in the "at-least-40%reduction" rule.
Also as to tangible personal property, a declining balance
method of 200%, 150%, or 100% could be elected on an
annual basis.
And generally, on a disposition of some such assets, no
gain or loss would be recognized; the disposition simply
would operate to reduce the balance in the appropriate
recovery account.
Public utilities would continue to use the.present ADR
system except that the ADR variance would b increased to
30%, from the present 20 %.
Real property on the other hand could be depreciated,
first, as now; second, over a shorter elective 20-year period
but only if the taxpayer uses the straight line composite
method or; third, if owner-occupied-over a 15-year period
using a 150% declining balance method-but in such case
the recapture rules applicable to personal property would
apply.
Low-income rental housing also could invoke the 15-year
period but in such case would be confined to the straightline method.
Compared with existing practice, these proposals
regarding real property would significantly reduce the cost
recovery period but, over the long haul, not nearly in the
degree which would result from enactment of 10-5-3's even
shorter and flat 10-year-useful-life rule.

Carter's Counter-Proposal re Depreciation

One week after the Senate Finance Committee reported
out its depreciation plan, President Carter announced his
plan.
In contrast to 10-5-3 which would be phased in over a fiveyear transition period, the plans of both the committee and
the President would be triggered in full on January 1, 1980,
thereby eliminating disincentives, i.e., eliminating any
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incentive to postpone acquisitions so as to obtain a later
phased-in more attractive depreciation arrangement.
The President's cost recovery system, labelled Constant
Rate Depreciation (CRD} , also was designed to avoid yet
another consequence, common in this instance-though in
different degrees-to both the Senate committee's proposal
and the 10-5-3 plan. The Senate committee's system would
distort normal competitive forces in our economy, though
less so than 10-5-3, in that it would favor one industry over
another. This would result because the committee proposes
to compress all types of equipment into only four open
ended accounts geared, respectively, to 2-4-7, and 10-year
useful lives, with the particular account appropriate for the
entire equipment of a given industry being dependent on
which account would result in an "at least" 40% reduction
in the currently applicable ADR useful life.
The President's plan seeks to avoid such discrimination,
first, by having many more classes of assets (a separate
class for each of 30 different industries) than the
committee's four (though far fewer than ADR's present
number-130) . Second, though as to any given industry his
plan would combine into one depreciation rate both the
useful-life and method-of-depreciation factors, greater
neutrality as between industries still would result because
the plan contemplates that the appropriate rate for a given
industry would be determined by reference to an acrossthe-board 40% reduction rule, using as a point of departure
the most favorable depreciation rate now permitted a given
industry under ADR.
Most taxpayers with respect to equipment would use only
two accounts, one for common assets (such as vehicles and
office furniture), and the other for equipment classified by
industry (such as agriculture, construction, utilities, and
various categories of manufacturing} . All such assets
purchased, new and used, would be added to one openended account for each class.
CRD would also apply to industrial and commercial
buildings, with a separate account being maintained for
each building.
Quite obviously, the President's proposal regarding
depreciation is less generous to taxpayers and less costly in
lost revenue than the Senate committee's plan.
Reagan Agrees with Senate Committee
For a time, it appeared that Mr. Reagan would support
the yet even more costly 10-5-3 plan as an addition to his
massive three-year 30% rate cut for individuals. More
recently, however, releases from his campaign
headquarters bearing on a depreciation plan have used
revenue-loss figures which are identical to those associated
not with 10-5-3, but with the Senate committee's
depreciation proposal to which he still would tack on the
large Kemp-Roth reduction for individuals.

Senate Committee and the President: Other Differ,ences
However, in contrast to Mr. Reagan, both the Senate
committee's and the President's plans include yet
additional cuts for business over and above favorable
depreciation changes; though here, too, there are
differences between their respective proposals.
The President would add these three additional features:
First, a full 10% investment credit would become
available for purchases of all new equipment having a
useful life of more than one year, in contrast to the present
graduated arrangement under which equipment must have
a useful life of at least three years to qualify even for 1/3 of
the existing 10% credit and must have a useful life of seven
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years to qualify fully.
Second, instead of accommodating a taxpayer's excess
unused credits only by permitting a three-year-carryback
and seven-year-carry-forward as now; he proposes further
to aid firms experiencing cyclical downturns and newly
organized or other rapidly growing firms by making
refundable 30% of any post-1980 excess unused credits,
with carrybacks and carryforwards applying to the
remainder. The annual cost: $2.4 billion in calendar 1981.
Third and finally , at a further revenue cost not to exceed
$1 billion annually, a new Targeted Investment Credit
would be tacked on, permitting an additional 10%
investment credit for qualifying investments for which,
with an eye on declining and high unemployment areas, the
Commerce Department agrees to issue certificates of
necessity.
The Senate committee, to its 2-4-7-10 depreciation system,
would add the following:
First, in the case of interior or exterior renovation,
restoration, or re-construction depreciable costs incurred in
connection with a building which has been in use for at
least 20 years, the so-called rehabilitation tax credit would
be increased from its present 10% figure to 25% .
Second, a new 25% incremental research and
development tax credit would be allowed for research
expenditures to the extent they exceeded similar average
annual expenditures over a defined earlier base period. To
minimize interpretative difficulties, both for this purpose
and with reference to the presently allowed deduction for
research expenditures, the latter would be defined
essentially as they are now defined for accounting purposes
by Financial Accounting Standards Board Statement No. 2.
Third, to the foregoing depreciation and credit
provisions-involving a revenue loss of $10.4 billion for
.. calendar '81-the committee would add corporate rate
reduction costing another $1.5 billion in '81 and twice that in
'82. Over a two-year transition period, the committee would
revise the corporate rate structure by increasing the
number of brackets to seven, the bottom bracket ultimately
to be 15% , with the top-44% being applicable only to
income exceeding $200,000.
Finally, corporations other than those engaged in
rendering professional services (health, law, engineering,
architecture, accounting, performing arts, or consulting},
could accumulate a minimum $250,000 of earnings without
running the risk of being charged with the present penalty
tax which is applied when accumulated profits exceed the
reasonable needs of a business.

Conclusions
In General

The foregoing recital leads me to conclude that among
political leaders at the highest level, a consensus is
emerging favoring at the least a fairly radical change in our
depreciation practices. Even Mr. Anderson, who first and
foremost calls for a balanced budget (because of his deep
concern regarding inflation) calls-subject to that one
limitation-for a fairly early shift in our depreciation
practices toward an arrangement similar to that proposed
by the Senate committee.
Second, while this consensus, fostering much more
favorable depreciation practices, evolved during a preelection campaign and, thus, also during what hopefully
proves to be a temporary recession, the consensus itself is
almost certain to survive both the election and even
emergence from the recession, for the rhetoric of our
political leaders, accompanying the consensus, emphasizes
not the recession, but rather a different truth-the business

sector's Jong-range burden of improving productivity and of
creating new additional jobs for an expanding labor force .
Third, given our high inflation rate (which
knowledgeable persons tend to concede will be with us in
significant degree for several years), it is far from clear,
even if Mr: Reagan is elected, that a post-election Congress
will agree to devote the lion's share of our deficitgenerating tax-cutting capacity to tax cuts for individual
consumers, as is contemplated by Kemp-Roth and currently
by Mr. Reagan. For that Congress, with the election behind
it and with a greater chance to be objective, will have
drummed into it, day after day, facts about the enormously
important function the business sector performs for our
society and the difficulty that sector now facesin
performing that awesome function at acceptable levels in
this shrinking and ever more competitive world.
Fourth, neither is it clear, if our inflation rate remains
relatively high for several years, that the size of the tax cuts
which the "consensus" now envisages for the business
sector will be sufficiently large to solve, almost alone, that
sector's productivity and expansion problems. The point: If
within a year or two, the growth in productivity remains
unsatisfactory, expect yet another and probably more
radical change in our tax system.
Why? As was suggested earlier, many factors (e.g.,
research, education, labor-management relationships,
inflation, capital investments, and even mere attitudes)
intertwine in constantly changing ways to affect our
productivity and growth. Taxes, also indirectly a
contributing factor, happen to be one of those most readily
dealt with by a government otherwise disinclined to involve
its bureaucracy more directly in managing the marketplace. In consequence, if our productivity, etc., does not
improve within a year or two, political leaders who bear
responsibility for this nation's welfare will seize again on
tax stimulants if only because of a reluctance to take the
risk that the ship would right itself without some further
alteration in the relevant rules which could affect its
course. As they would see it, responsiveness to such
national problems is in keeping with the stimulating
function, the tradition, and the genetics of all law, and of
the tax law in particular.
And among the alternatives likely to be considered at that
time are two which until a month ago were favored for
immediate implementation by the chairman of the House
Ways and Means Committee-Al Ullman.
Until a month ago, he was backing his own proposed Tax
Restructure Act of 1980. It called for steep cuts in Social
Security taxes and in both individual and corporate income
taxes-including in the latter case, inter alia, a major shift
toward more generous depreciation practices which adds
also to our previously mentioned consensus.
Included in the cut for individuals was a newly devised
method for attacking the double taxation of distributed
corporate profits, simultaneously providing a built-in
compelling link assuring savings and capital investment.
With the aim of enabling corporations to retain a larger part
of their cash flow, any domestic corporation would be
allowed to establish a plan under which any individual
shareholder could elect to receive a dividend in the form of
that corporation's newly issued stock rather than cash. An
electing shareholder could exclude from income up to
$1,500 ($3,000 in a married couple's joint return) of such
stock dividends. Those dividend shares would have a zero
basis but, if held for over one year, the shareholder on a
later sale would enjoy capital gain treatment.
The restructuring which he contemplated until a month
ago involved tax reductions of $115 billion. But to make up
for that immense loss in revenue, he simultaneously
proposed yet another savings or capital-fostering device-a
new 10% value added tax.

This latter type of levy contains a decided bias favoring
capital formation, for in the end it applies only to
acquisition of consumers' goods. But for that same reason,
absent a compensating or ameliorating provision, this type
of flat rate tax actually would be quite regressive. That
portion of a taxpayer's income which is saved (invested)
would be excluded from the tax base and, of course,
taxpayers in higher income brackets save proportionately
more of their incomes than those less fortunate.
Of course, to the extent the revenue from this tax was
designed to replace Social Security tax revenues ($43
billion under this bill), we simply would be substituting one
regressive tax for another. For the flat rate Social Security
levy is also regressive in that it applies only to wages and
then only up to a given amount. Excluded from the tax base
is that part of a taxpayer's income which is derived from
capital and this immunized part tends, proportionately, to
increase as total income increases.
But to the extent value-added-tax revenues replace
revenues previously produced by individual income taxes
(here $40 billion), the new tax obviously would make our
federal tax system as a whole less progressive than it now
is. Mitigating, but not eliminating this, was the function of
one provision in the Ullman bill which differed on this
count from most European models. A zero rate would be
applied to food, medical care, and certain educational
services, as well as to housing.
Not irrelevant to this tax's future is the fact that Senator
Long, chairman of the Senate Finance Committee, still says
that he favors major restructuring, reducing significantly
our reliance on income taxes, using value added taxes to
replace the large revenues involved. But adoption of it,
added this patient man, would have to be postponed,
probably for several years, awaiting two circumstances: (1)
• education of the American people as to how the tax would
work; and (2) demonstration to them that such a tax simply
had to become an essential part of our savings or capitalfostering system.
To you, for being equally patient, my thanks. Otherwise,
beyond the foregoing this deponent predicteth not.

L. Hart Wright
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